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1 Introduction
Many economic institutions rely on competition to provide e¤ort incentives.
Contests where only a small subset of players is rewarded with a prize are
a prominent example. The recent literature has argued that there are many
natural examples where this prize should be regarded as endogenous, in-
uenced by the e¤orts of the players. Several authors have carefully an-
alyzed the mixed-strategy equilibria of all-pay auctions with endogenous
prizes (AEP) for symmetric and asymmetric contestants.2 While this lit-
erature provides a very general and complete analysis of the equilibrium for
any given all-pay auction with endogenous prizes, this paper complements
previous work by addressing issues of implementation and optimality.
As an illustration, consider rms engaging in patent races to obtain new
products. When rms exert high research e¤orts, this will usually not only
increase the chances of obtaining the patent, but it will also help to improve
the quality of the product and thereby the monopoly prots obtained in the
product market. Thus, the prize obtained by winning the patent is an in-
creasing function of e¤orts. The shape of this function cannot be designed
freely by a regulator. Technology determines the relation between e¤ort and
quality; demand determines the relation between quality and prots. Con-
tests with similar features are pervasive. As we will detail in Section 6, they
include beauty contests, where a client invites suppliers to submit project
proposals and then procures the project from the supplier who submitted
the best proposal, as well as promotion races where employees compete to
climb up the career ladder within an organization. We will see that prize
functions may be increasing or decreasing in these cases.3
Such motivated, we analyze a model of an all-pay auction with complete
information, one prize and identical prize functions for all players.4 In the
rst part of the paper, we go further and assume that players also have the
same e¤ort cost functions and thus are perfectly symmetric.
2See, in particular, Kaplan et al. (2003) and Siegel (2009, 2010, 2012).
3For further examples, see, e.g., Chowdhury (2010) and Siegel (2012).
4The model is similar to those previously analzed by Siegel (2009, 2010, 2012) and
Kaplan et al. (2003).
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The rst main question is: If we have little information on the details of
a competitive environment (e.g., a patent race), except that it is generated
by an AEP, what can we say about the possible e¤ort distributions that can
result as mixed-strategy equilibria? In other words, what kind of behavior
can be implemented by suitable AEP? Our results show that implementation
of very general distributions is possible with symmetric players; in other
words, the mere fact that a competitive environment corresponds to an AEP
imposes hardly any restrictions on the e¤ort distributions. In spite of their
simple and special structure, AEPs are thus very rich in terms of the behavior
they can induce.
In some contexts, however, there are natural properties of prize functions
that can be exploited to obtain stronger restrictions on the outcomes of
AEPs. For instance, in the patent race where the prize function reects
expected monopoly prots and its shape depends on demand parameters,
the prize function is usually increasing and often concave in e¤ort. With
these additional restrictions, we show that only equilibrium distributions
with decreasing density functions can arise.
The second main question addresses a central welfare issue in the context
of e¤ort incentives. In many competitive situations, the e¤orts of losers are
wasted from an ex-post point of view, that is, they only serve to induce
the winner to exert higher e¤orts. Again, this is the case in patent races
where only the winner can introduce the good. We therefore ask under
which circumstances AEP induce high expected highest e¤ort without also
generating excessive loser e¤orts. Specically, we show that the ratio between
expected highest e¤orts and expected average e¤orts becomes higher for AEP
than for all-pay auctions with xed prizes. Particularly high ratios can be
obtained when there is an approximately linear relation between e¤ort and
prize or when there are hurdles, that is, reservation values that are necessary
to obtain a prize.
Finally, we study the above-mentioned applications. We show that, given
the expected average e¤orts of rms competing to introduce product innova-
tions, patents lead to higher expected product quality than research prizes
that compensate for e¤orts. For promotion contests, we show that a principal
who gives a xed prize for promotion is not necessarily better of if contestants
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also take into account that high e¤orts may have direct positive e¤ects on
their utility.
In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. Section 3 introduces the
framework. Section 4 deals with symmetric players, Section 5 with asym-
metric players. In Section 6, we provide several applications. Section 7
concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on contests has been nicely surveyed by Konrad (2009). We
thus focus more specically on AEPs.
Kaplan et al. (2003) have treated a symmetric two-player innovation
game with symmetric information, where rms commit to the timing of an
innovation. After a simple transformation of variables, the game is almost
identical to the AEP with symmetric rms that we consider.5 Depending
on the prize function, the authors obtain (i) equilibria with randomization
on an interval containing zero e¤orts, (ii) equilibria with an atom at zero
and randomization on an interval starting with a positive e¤ort, (iii) more
general equilibria with non-connected support.
The asymmetric case has been treated both by Kaplan et al. (2003) and
by Siegel (2009, 2010) under mutually exclusive assumptions.6 In Kaplan et
al., the support of the strong players e¤ort distribution does not contain zero,
whereas the support for the weak player contains an atom at zero. In Siegel
(2009, 2010), the support of the e¤ort distribution is a compact interval
containing the minimal e¤ort, even for the strong player. Also, expected
prizes with two players are positive only for the strong player and zero for
the weak player.7 In some important dimensions, Siegels analysis is more
general than both our paper and Kaplan et al. (2003). He considers more
than two players and multiple prizes and he allows for investments that are
5Essentially, one can dene the e¤ort as the inverse of the time needed for innovation.
6Kaplan et al. deal only with the two-player case and assume that the prize becomes
zero for zero e¤orts. Siegel assumes that prizes are positive for minimal e¤orts (and that
net prizes are declining in e¤orts).
7This result has been generalized in Siegel (2012).
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conditional on winning or losing. Also, he allows for very general types of
prize and cost asymmetries.8
Contrary to the existing literature, our main concern is to analyze which
CDFs can be implemented as MSE of AEPs and which prize functions induce
high expected highest e¤orts. To this end, we allow for prize functions that
are compatible with the assumptions of Siegel as well as Kaplan et al. Ac-
cordingly, we obtain both equilibria where small positive e¤orts are avoided
by the strong player (as in Kaplan et al. 2003) and equilibria where they
are played (as in Siegel 2009, 2010).9 We also provide a recursive formula
for MSE with arbitrarily many connected components in the symmetric case.
Though this possibility arises in Kaplan et al. (2003) and Siegel (2012), there
is no analogous result there.
A more broadly related literature allows for asymmetric information in
AEP. Kaplan et al. (2002) derive comparative static results when the prize
function di¤ers across player types, which are private information. In a sim-
ilar setting, Cohen et al. (2008) consider the optimal prize function for a
principal who cares about maximizing total e¤ort or expected highest e¤ort
(net of expected prizes). Interestingly, the optimal prize function can be
decreasing in e¤orts for suitable prize functions when there are many par-
ticipants. We do not deal with asymmetric information, because we want
to focus on which e¤ort distributions can be generated endogenously rather
than as a reection of type distributions.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) is a paper that does not deal with AEP, but
deserves to be mentioned. It also analyzes the question of maximizing the
expected highest e¤ort, but in a setting with xed prizes and asymmetric
information. Instead of asking how the shape of the prize function a¤ects
expected highest e¤ort, the authors address the role of the number of prizes.
8Chowdhury (2010) analyzes a modied all-pay auction where prizes are xed, but
not guaranteed even for a player who has exerted e¤ort. If the probability that a prize
is actually distributed is increasing in the e¤ort of the high-e¤ort player, the game is
isomorphic to an AEP with endogenous prizes.
9Several authors have also considered the case that prizes depend not only on the e¤ort
of the winner, but also on the loser (Skaperdas 1992, Chung 1996, Baye et al. 2010); Sacco
and Schmutzler (2008) provide an experimental analysis.
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3 Set-Up and Terminology
We consider a game with complete information. Risk-neutral players i 2 I 
f1; 2; :::; ng simultaneously choose e¤orts xi from Xi = R+ at costs Ki(xi).
Assumption A1: Ki(xi) = kixi for positive constants ki > 0
such that k1  k2  :::  kn = 1.10
Let x i = (x1; :::; xi 1; xi+1; :::; xn). Player i wins a prize of size a(xi)
with probability p(xi;x i) = 1 if xi > maxj 6=i xj and p(xi;x i) = 0 if xi <
maxj 6=i xj. If several players exert the same highest e¤ort, each of them wins
with the same probability. The expected payo¤ of player i is
i(xi;x i) = p(xi;x i)a(xi)  kixi. (1)
Except where otherwise mentioned, we maintain the following assumptions
on the prize function a(xi), a: R+ ! R+.
Assumption A2: a(xi) is (i) right continuous on R+, and (ii)
it is continuously di¤erentiable to the right on (0;1).
Assumption A3: (i)8i 2 I9ri > 0 s.t. a(ri) = kiri and a(xi) <
kixi for xi > ri.
(ii) a(xi) is continuously di¤erentiable in an open neighborhood
of ri, with a0(ri) < ki for i = 1; :::; n.
We apply the notation a0(xi) to denote the right derivative even where no
left derivative exists. We call prize functions satisfying A2 and A3 admissible.
The left panel in Figure 1 depicts examples. A3(i) corresponds to the nite
reach assumption, which is required for existence of an MSE.11 A3(ii) rules
out degenerate cases where the prize function touches the cost function from
below at ri (as in the right panel of Figure 1).
10The requirement that max (k1; :::; kn) = 1 is a normalization that guarantees that
e¤orts can be identied with monetary costs in the symmetric case.
11See Siegel (2009, 2010); similarly in Kaplan et al. (2003).
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Denition 1 An all-pay auction with endogenous prize (AEP) is a
simultaneous game with players i 2 I  f1; 2; :::; ng, action spaces Xi = R+
and payo¤s functions i(xi;x i) given by (1), where Ki(xi) satises A1 and
a: R+ ! R+ satises A2 and A3.
Figure 1: Admissible and non-admissible prize functions
All our statements refer to AEPs. Contrary to the setting with xed
prizes, A1 is not a strong restriction with endogenous prizes.12 An AEP
with some arbitrary e¤ort measure xi and a corresponding monotone in-
creasing (potentially non-linear) cost function can always be transformed
into an equivalent all-pay auction satisfying A1.13 In Section 4, we impose
the additional restriction of symmetric cost functions.
(SYM): ki = 1 for all players (Ki  K).
As Siegel (2009, 2010), we use the following concepts for an AEP.
Denition 2 (i) The reach of player i is ri as in A3(i).
12Moldovanu and Sela (2001) analyze how the optimal number of prizes depends on the
second derivatives of the e¤ort cost functions.
13Consider the transformation xTi = Ki(xi). Let K
 1(x i)  
K 11 (x1); :::;K
 1
i 1(xi 1);K
 1
i+1(xi+1); :::;K
 1
n (xn)

. Then consider the all-pay auc-
tion with endogenous prize dened by aT (xTi ) = a(K
 1(xTi )) and K
T
i (x
T
i ) = x
T
i , where
rms choose e¤orts xTi , the winner obtains a
T and the cost function is KTi . This AEP has
the same economic content, except for the renormalization of variables. Nevertheless, the
transformation leads to important changes in the interpretation of results. For instance,
if the principal cares about the expectation of the e¤ort xi in the all-pay auction with a
quadratic cost function, his objective function will be the expected root of the e¤ort exi
after the transformation.
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(ii) The threshold T of the game is r2.
(iii) The power of player i is wi = max fa (T )  kiT; 0g.
The reach is higher for players with lower e¤ort costs; thus, it is decreasing
in i. Actions above the threshold are dominated for i = 2; :::; n; unless
dominated strategies are played by the opponent, the strongest player can
secure himself the prize by choosing e¤orts just above the threshold. With
(SYM), actions above the threshold are dominated for all players.
As pure strategies often do not exist in AEP, we focus on mixed strategies.
Denition 3 (i) A mixed strategy of player i in an AEP is given by a
cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi : R! R such that Fi(xi) = 0 for
xi < 0. 14
(ii) A mixed strategy prole F consists of mixed strategies F1; :::; Fn on
X1; :::; Xn:
(iii) A mixed strategy prole F is a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) if
each Fi maximizes (1) given F i.
(iv) The support Si of a mixed strategy Fi is dened as the set
fxi 2 Xi jFi (xi + ")  Fi (xi   ") > 08" > 0g. We write S = Si when Si is
independent of i.
The following denition is central.
Denition 4 An admissible prize function a(:) implements a prole F
of CDFs if F is an MSE for the AEP given by a(:). When a(:) implements
a symmetric F =(F; :::; F ), we also say that a(:) implements the CDF F .
Under symmetry, the following types of MSE are of particular interest.
Denition 5 Suppose SYM holds.
(i) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is an interval equilibrium without
atoms if it admits a density f which is positive only on S = [0; T ].
(ii) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is called an interval equilibrium with
14 Equivalently, one can dene a mixed strategy by a probability measure P on Xi; the
corresponding F is given by F = P [0; xi]. When a mixed strategy is given by F , the
corresponding P is induced by P
 
x1i ; x
2
i

= F (x2i )  F (x1i ).
8
atoms if it has support [0; T ], but has an atom.
(iii) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is a hurdle equilibrium if S = f0g [
[HS; T ] for some HS > 0, the hurdle.
The following denitions will play an important role.
Denition 6 (i) a(xi) satises decreasing (average) e¤ort productivity
(DEP) if a(xi)
xi
is strictly decreasing on [0; T ].
(ii) The e¤ort hurdle (HS  HS(a)) is the minimal xi such that a(xi)xi is
strictly decreasing on
 
xi; T

.
HS exists by A3(ii). If DEP holds, H

S = 0. DEP implies that a(xi) > 0
for xi 2 (0; T ], because a(T )T = 1 > 0. If a(xi) is di¤erentiable, HS is the
minimal xi < T such that a
0(xi) <
a(xi)
xi
for all xi 2 (xi; T ].
4 Symmetric Case
The main result for symmetric players, Proposition 3, shows which CDFs
can be implemented as symmetric interval equilibria. We also provide gen-
eral implementation results for distributions without small positive e¤orts in
the support (Propositions 5 and 6). Moreover, we investigate which prize
functions implement MSE with high expected highest e¤orts. As a prepa-
ration, we characterize the MSE for symmetric prize functions under DEP
in Proposition 1, and we also discuss uniqueness (Proposition 2). In Section
4.4, we show that additional MSE arise if DEP is relaxed.
4.1 Existence, Characterization and Uniqueness
We rst focus on interval equilibria; more equilibria will be discussed in
Section 4.4. We distinguish between three mutually exclusive cases, C1-C3.
(C1) (i) a(0) > 0 and (ii) DEP holds.
Siegel (2010) uses C1(i), and instead of C1(ii) he assumes declining net
prizes a(xi) xi, as for a1 (xi) in the left panel of Figure 1.15 For di¤erentiable
15Similar assumptions are used in Siegel (2009).
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a(xi), declining net prizes imply a0(xi) < 1 and thus a0(xi) <
a(xi)
xi
for a(xi) 
xi, so that DEP holds.16 C1 also holds for strictly concave functions such as
a2 (xi) in Figure 1 even if they do not satisfy declining net prizes. Some non-
concave functions such as a3 (xi) also satisfy C1. The following alternative
condition allows for prizes that are zero when there is no e¤ort.
(C2) (i) a(0) = 0, (ii) a0(0)  limxi!0 a0(xi) =1 and (iii) DEP holds.
This obviously excludes declining net prizes, but it includes concave prize
functions such as a4 (xi) in Figure 1.17
Finally, we allow for prize functions with a(0) = 0 and nite slope at zero.
(C3) (i) a(0) = 0, (ii) a0(0) <1 and (iii) DEP holds.
We can now characterize the MSE.
Proposition 1 Suppose SYM and DEP hold.
(i) An MSE exists for which
[F (xi)]
n 1 =
xi
a(xi)
for 0 < xi  T (2)
(ii) If C1 and C2 hold, the equilibrium CDF is atomless; if C3 holds, there
is an atom at 0 with mass

1
a0(0)
 1
n 1
.
Intuitively, the indi¤erence condition for an MSE requires that players are
exactly compensated for expected e¤orts. Thus, (2) must hold. The proof
shows that the conditions of the proposition su¢ ce to make sure that (2)
denes an MSE.
We rule out other symmetric MSE than those in Proposition 1 if DEP
holds. Moreover, interval equilibria cannot exist if DEP does not hold.
16This implication holds because with a0(xi) < 1 the net prize a(xi)   xi has at most
one xed point and a(xi) > xi if and only if xi lies to the left of this point. Thus
a0(xi) < 1 <
a(xi)
xi
whenever a(xi) > xi.
17Specically, the class a(x) = x with  > 0 and  < 1 satises C2. Note that x is
not necessarily monotone increasing (only if  2 (0; 1)).
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Proposition 2 Suppose SYM holds.
(i) If DEP holds, the MSE described in Proposition 1 is unique.
(ii) If DEP does not hold, the AEP does not have an interval equilibrium.
Thus, an AEP has an interval equilibrium if and only if DEP holds.
4.2 Implementation Results
We now consider the converse problem. Suppose given a CDF F , does there
exist an admissible prize function which implements this CDF? We provide a
complete characterization of the CDFs that can be implemented as interval
equilibria of a suitable AEP. From Propositions 1 and 2, any candidate prize
function with MSE F and support [0; T ] must satisfy
aF (xi) =
xi
[F (xi)]
n 1 for 0 < xi  T
aF (0) = limxi!0
xi
[F (xi)]
n 1 for xi = 0
. (3)
Also by Propositions 1 and 2, a prize function satisfying (3) is admissible
and yields the equilibrium CDF F if and only if A2, A3 and, in addition, C1
or C2 hold. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose a CDF F has a density f such that fxij f(xi) > 0g =
[0; C] for C > 0.
(i) F can be implemented as interval equilibrium without atoms if and only
if the following conditions both hold:
lim
xi!0
F (xi)
n 2f(xi) > 0. (4)
lim
xi!0
F (xi)
n 2f(xi) < 1 or lim
xi!0
F (xi)  xi (n  1) f(xi)
F (xi)n
> 0 (5)
(ii) If (4) holds, but (5) does not, then F can be implemented as interval
equilibrium with atom at zero.
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The proof shows that (4) guarantees that aF is admissible.18 (5) makes
sure that aF satises C1 or C2. Hence, F = (F; :::; F ) really is an interval
equilibrium without atoms in case (i) and with atoms in case (ii).
Additional properties of a(xi) require further restrictions on F :
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, a(xi) can be chosen to
be strictly increasing if and only if
f(xi)
F (xi)
<
1
(n  1)xi8xi 2 [0; C] (6)
Proposition 3 is very powerful if n = 2.
Corollary 2 If n = 2, any CDF F with a nite and strictly positive den-
sity on [0; C] for C > 0 can be implemented as interval equilibrium without
atoms for an admissible prize function a(xi). If f is di¤erentiable, this prize
function is
(i) strictly concave if and only if 8xi 2 R+
f 0(xi)
f(xi)
+
2
xi
  2 f(xi)
F (xi)
< 0; (7)
(ii) strictly increasing if and only if f(xi)
F (xi)
< 1
xi
8xi 2 R+;
(iii) not strictly increasing and concave unless f 0(xi) < 0 8xi 2 R+.
Condition (ii) requires f(xi)
F (xi)
to be smaller than for the uniform distribu-
tion, which is the MSE for the AEP with xed prize.
Even when the density is not nite, implementation is often possible for
n = 2. For instance, in Section 4.3 we show that power distributions can be
obtained as MSE for suitable prize functions.19
For n > 2, implementation by admissible prize functions is only possible
if the density is unbounded.
Corollary 3 Let n > 2. A CDF F with density f cannot be implemented as
an interval equilibrium if limxi!0 f(xi) <1.
18If (4) does not hold, the candidate function does not converge to a nite value as
e¤orts approach zero, so that A2 is violated.
19In this case, the rst condition in (5) is violated, but the second one is not.
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4.3 Optimality
How does the prize function a¤ect expected average and highest e¤orts? We
compare prize equivalent AEP, that is, AEP resulting in the same expected
prize payments in the MSE.
Expected Average E¤orts In any MSE of a symmetric AEP containing 0
in the support, players must receive expected prizes that exactly compensate
their e¤ort costs. Thus, the following result is immediate from A1.
Proposition 4 If SYM holds, any two prize-equivalent AEPs yield the same
expected e¤ort.
Expected Highest E¤orts As argued in the introduction, it is often de-
sirable in applications to induce a high expected highest e¤ort (rst-order
statistic), while keeping average e¤orts low. For n = 2, this amounts to a
high ratio
2 =
2
R C
0
xif(xi)F (xi)dxiR C
0
xif(xi)dxi
:
Because F (xi)  1, 2  2. To understand how close 2 can be to this
maximum, we focus on a rich class of examples. For parameters  > 0 and
 < 1, we consider the prize functions
a(xi) = x

i : (8)
For  = 0, (8) denes a xed prize all-pay auction. The limit case  = 1 is a
linear prize function. More generally,  corresponds to higher sensitivity of
prizes to e¤orts: The ratio between the prize of a player that wins with e¤ort
xH and the prize of a player that wins with e¤ort xL < xH is increasing in .
As (8) satises A2-A3 and C2, it denes an AEP if K(xi) = xi. Thus, by
Propositions 1 and 2, the unique symmetric MSE is the power distribution
F (xi) = P
;(xi) 
(
1

x1 i for 0 < xi  
1
1 
1 for xi  
1
1 
: (9)
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Standard calculations show that prize equivalence implies 
1
1  1 
2  = C,
where C is the expected cost (e¤ort); examples of such equivalence classes
are depicted in Figure A1. Solving for  yields
 =

C
2  
1  
1 
. (10)
Inserting (10) in (8), a(xi; ) =

C 2 
1 
1 
xi for  < 1 gives a class of
prize equivalent AEP. Several members of a class of prize equivalent AEP
are depicted in Figure A2 for C = 1 and  =  0:1; 0; 0:5 and 0:8.
Figure 2: Expected average and highest e¤ort in symmetric game as a func-
tion of  for a(xi)  1 (left panel) and within a class of prize-equivalent APA
(right panel)
Using (9), any class of prize equivalent AEP given by (10) corresponds
to a class of equilibrium CDFs

C 2 
1 
 1
x1 i . The upward-sloping curve
in the right panel in Figure 2 shows the equilibrium expected highest e¤ort
2:2 as a function of  within a class of prize equivalent AEP: Thus, within
the class of incentive systems that lead to power distributions, the resulting
expected highest e¤ort approaches the theoretical maximum of twice the
expected average e¤ort as  ! 1. For completeness, the panel also contains
the expected average e¤ort ?, which is independent of  within each class
of prize-equivalent AEP (consistent with Proposition 4). The left panel in
Figure 2 displays expected highest and average e¤orts as decreasing functions
of  for  = 1. The di¤erence to the right panel arises because, as  increases,
 must increase to guarantee prize equivalence. A ceteris paribus increase
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in  has negative e¤ects on e¤orts, but the concomitant increase in  has
positive e¤ects. Thus, we obtain:
Result: For n = 2, the maximum possible expected highest e¤ort
level within the class a(xi) = x

i is approximated by choosing 
close to one, that is, by approximating a linear prize function.
Note that decreasing prize functions ( < 0) lead to lower expected high-
est e¤ort levels than increasing price functions ( 2 (0; 1)). This is worth
pointing out, because Cohen et al. (2008) have shown that decreasing prize
functions can play an e¤ort-enhancing role when there is uncertainty about
player types (See Section 2). However, even in their case, this requires the
number of players to be su¢ ciently large.
4.4 Beyond Interval Equilibria
DEP is a convenient property of prize functions, but it is not always plausible.
For instance, in patent races, extremely low e¤orts will typically not generate
a positive prize. Therefore, we now show that, when DEP is violated, more
general equilibria may exist.
4.4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
We will construct non-degenerate intervals [H1; J1], [H2; J2],...,

HK ; JK

such that H1 = HS; J
1 = T and Hk > Jk+1 so that one of the following two
cases arises: (i) TheMSE has supportHk  [H1; J1] [ [H2; J2][...[ HK ; JK,
where HK = 0 (Figure 3); (ii) the MSE has support f0g [ Hk (not de-
picted). The sequences are constructed so that the restriction of a(xi)
xi
to Hk
is monotone decreasing. We use the following mild non-linearity restriction.
(C4) a(xi)
xi
is non-constant on any open interval in [0; T ].
Specically, we use the following recursive denition.
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Figure 3: Equilibria with Non-Connected Support
Denition 7 Suppose C4 holds. Let J1 = T and H1 = HS. Moreover, for
all k where the corresponding quantities are well-dened, let
Jk = max
(
xi < H
k 1
 a(xi)xi = a(H
k 1)
Hk 1 and 9" > 0 such that
a(xi)
xi
is strictly increasing on (xi   "; xi)
)
Hk = max

xi < J
k
a (xi)xi is strictly decreasing on xi; Jk

We impose the following very weak restriction on a (xi).
(C5) a(xi)
xi
has nitely many local maxima on [0; T ].
Proposition 5 Suppose SYM, (C4) and (C5) hold
(i) If there exists " > 0 such that a(exi)exi > maxxi>exi a(xi)xi 8exi 2 (0; "], a MSE
without atoms exists for which S = HK and [F (xi)]n 1 a(xi) = xi on HK.
(ii)If maxxi(0;T )
a(xi)
xi
exists, a MSE exists for which S = f0g[HK. There is
an atom at 0 with size

HK
a(HK)
 1
n 1
. Also, [F (xi)]
n 1 a(xi) = xi on HK.
The condition in (i) generalizes DEP: It does not require that a(xi)
xi
is
decreasing globally, but nevertheless the highest values are attained near zero.
In this case, the support still contains a non-degenerate interval including
zero. When (ii) applies, low positive values (below Hk > 0) are not attained.
We also have the following uniqueness result:
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Proposition 6 Suppose SYM, (C4) and(C5) hold. There exist no other
equilibria than those described in Proposition 5.
4.4.2 Implementation
We restrict implementation results to the particularly interesting case of hur-
dle equilibria, which have the potentially attractive property that small pos-
itive e¤orts are not played. As argued repeatedly, it may be useful to have
prize functions that generate e¤ort distributions without small positive ef-
forts. We rst show that Proposition 5 implies a condition for existence of
hurdle equilibria, which is, for instance, satised by a5 in Figure 1:
Corollary 4 If HS > 0 is an interior global maximum of
a(xi)
xi
on [0; T ], a
hurdle equilibrium exists. The support is S = f0g [ [HS; T ] and
[F (xi)]
n 1 =
xi
a(xi)
for HS  xi  T ; (11)
there is an atom at 0 with mass

HS
a(HS)
 1
n 1
: (12)
Corollary 4 leads to an implementation result for such distributions.
Proposition 7 Suppose SYM holds. Consider a strictly increasing CDF F
with a density f such that fxij f(xi) > 0g = [0; C] for some C > 0. For
HS 2 (0; C), let
FHS(xi) =
(
F (xi) for xi > HS
F (HS) for xi  HS
.
Then, there exists an AEP for which the unique MSE is the hurdle equilibrium
described in Corollary 4 with hurdle HS.
The simplest way to construct the required prize function is by choosing
aF
HS (xi) = 0 for xi  HS and aFHS (xi) = xi(F (xi))n 1 for xi 2 (HS; T ]; above
T , aF
HS can be extended by any function that satises aF
HS (xi)  xi. Im-
plementation of a CDF as a hurdle equilibrium is unique only on the interval
[HS; T ]. For values below the hurdle, any su¢ ciently kinked prize function
guarantees that downward deviations from the hurdle are not attractive.
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4.4.3 Optimality
As argued above, it appears plausible that hurdle equilibria induce high ex-
pected highest e¤orts. To this end, we reconsider the class of power func-
tions xi . We now x  at specic values and consider hurdles that we allow
to vary. Specically, we write HS = hT for the threshold T = 
1
1  and
h 2 (0; 1). Using an analogous procedure as in Section 4.3, we then consider
parameter choices h 2 [0; 1),  2 [0; 1) that yield the same expected average
e¤ort. It turns out that these level curves are upward sloping: If the overall
level of prizes  is reduced, a reduction of the hurdle parameter h is neces-
sary to keep average e¤orts at the same level. Figure 4 depicts the ratio of
expected highest to average e¤orts as a function of h when expected average
e¤orts are xed at one. Thus, a simultaneous increase in the prize and the
hurdle that keeps expected average e¤orts xed increases expected highest
e¤orts.
Figure 4: Expected highest e¤ort with hurdle equilibria
5 Asymmetric cost functions
We now consider asymmetric costs functions. For simplicity, we use a more
restrictive version of A2 from now on.
Assumption A2: a(xi) is (i) continuous, and (ii) continuously di¤er-
entiable on (0;1).
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We rst deal with the characterization of the MSE and with implemen-
tation. As in Section 4.3, we then use a rich class of parameterized examples
to show which prize functions yield high expected highest e¤orts.
5.1 Characterization of MSE
We conne ourselves to the two-player case. We suppose that k1  k < 1 =
k2. Pure-strategy equilibria may exist for large cost asymmetries.
Proposition 8 If n = 2 and argmaxx12[0;r1] a(x1)  kx1 2 [r2; r1], the AEP
has a pure-strategy equilibrium (x1; x

2) with x

2 = 0.
In particular, a PSE exists if a(xi) is strictly concave and a0 (T ) > k.
From now on, we therefore assume that asymmetries are less pronounced, so
that the following assumption holds together with A1, A2and A3.
Assumption A6: a0(T )  k < 0
We give conditions under which we can characterize MSE. C1replaces
C1 with the condition from Siegel (2010).20
(C1) a(0) > 0 and a(xi)  kxi is strictly decreasing.
The alternative condition C2 is replaced as follows:
(C2) a(xi) is strictly concave.
Recall that C2 does not require concavity. However, contrary to C2, C2
does not restrict behavior of a (xi) near zero.
Denition 8 In the case of asymmetric cost functions, the e¤ort hurdle,
HA, is given by min fxi  0jka (xi)  a0(xi) (w1 + kxi)  0g.
This generalizes Denition 6, as w1 = 0 for symmetric cost functions.
20To repeat, however, the framework of Siegel is more general in other dimensions.
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Proposition 9 (a) If C1or C2holds, an MSE (F 1 ; F

2 ) exists such that:
(i) F 1 has support S1 = [HA; T ] and
F 1 (x1) =
x1
a (x1)
for HA  x1  T . (13)
(ii) F 2 has support S2 = f0g [ [HA; T ] and
F 2 (x2) =
8<:
w1+kHA
a(HA)
for x2 = 0
w1+kx2
a(x2)
for HA  x2  T
: (14)
(b) HA = 0 if and only if
a0(0)w1   ka(0)  0. (15)
(c) Expected payo¤s are zero for player 2 and w1 = (1  k)T for player 1.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, as in the symmetric case, the
maximum of the support is the threshold for both players. Second, however,
for strictly concave objective functions (C2), the support is not necessarily
the entire interval [0; T ]. Instead, an asymmetric hurdle equilibrium can exist
where players have the same minimal positive e¤ort level HA in the support.
(15) shows that this happens if asymmetries are large (k is small and w1 is
large) and zero e¤orts are unattractive (a(0) small and a0(0) high). Moreover,
the high-cost player must have an atom at zero, whereas the low-cost player
has an atom at HA. Third, for the two-player case treated here, Proposition
9 goes beyond Theorem 1 of Siegel (2009) and Theorem 3 of Siegel (2010).
Siegel requires that C1holds. The proof of Part (b) of Proposition 9 shows
that, in this case, the support is [0; T ] for both players, which is in line with
Siegels results. We show that the conclusion of Siegel can hold even if C1
is violated, but C2holds instead. We also identify conditions under which
the support is not [0; T ]. Finally, part (c) of Proposition 9 holds much more
generally, as Siegel (2012) has shown.
Moreover, all equilibria must be of the form just described.
Proposition 10 Suppose that C1or C2holds. Any MSE must be of the
form described in Proposition 9.
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For C1, Proposition 10 is already shown by Siegel (2009, 2010). Our
proof thus focuses on C2.
5.2 Implementation
Next, we present implementation results. Suppose given HA > 0, C > HA
and CDFs F1 and F2 with supports [HA; C] and f0g [ [HA; C], respectively.
We ask under which conditions a prize function with MSE (F1; F2) exists.
Propositions 9 and 10 imply that the equilibrium CDF F2 must satisfy
F2 (x2) =
8<:

(1 k)C
x2
+ k

F1(x1) for HA  x1 < C
(1 k)C
x2
+ k

F1(H

A) for 0  x1 < HA
: (16)
Thus, once the CDF of the strong player is xed, the CDF of the weak
player is determined by (16). The only candidate prize function that can
implement F1 on [HA; C] is aF1(x1) = x1F1(x1) . We start with implementation
by a decreasing net prize function. By Proposition 9(b), this requires that
the MSE has support [0; C] for both players.
Proposition 11 Suppose a CDF F1 has density f1 and fx1j f1(x1) > 0g =
[0; C] for C > 0. Let F2 be given by (16). Then (F1; F2) can be implemented
as the MSE of an AEP with a decreasing net prize function if and only if
F1(x1)  x1f1(x1) < k (F1(x1))2 . (17)
(17) implies that the candidate net prize function is decreasing.
Next, we ask which CDFs can result as MSE for strictly concave a(xi).
Proposition 12 Suppose a CDF F1 has di¤erentiable density f1 and 9 C >
HA  0 such that fx1j f1(x1) > 0g = [HA; C]. If F2 is given by (16), (F1; F2)
can be implemented as the MSE of an AEP with a strictly concave a(xi) if
and only if
f 01(x)
f1(x)
+
2
x
  2 f1(x)
F1(x)
< 0. (18)
Compared to the symmetric case, several points are worth noting. We
obtain analogous CDFs on [0; C] as for the symmetric case as candidates for
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the e¤ort distribution of the low-cost player. However, the lower end of the
distribution is replaced by an atom. Moreover, the other players CDF is
completely determined by the choice of the rst players CDF.
5.3 Optimality
We analyze expected e¤orts for prize functions given by (8). We consider
small asymmetry (k = 0:95) and large asymmetry (k = 0:85). Figure 5
describes the equilibrium CDF for k = 0:95 and  = 1 and three di¤erent
values of , (0, 0:5, 0:8). We shall refer to these cases as the xed prize case,
Figure 5: Equilibrium CDFs for player 1 (left) and 2 (right);  = 1; k = 0:95
the intermediate case and the almost-linear case, respectively.
5.3.1 Equilibrium structure
In the xed prize case, only the weak player has an atom at zero. As 
increases, atoms for both players emerge and the support becomes smaller.
For k = 0:85 (not depicted), the supports are smaller than for k = 0:95 and
the atoms are larger; the MSE thus approaches an asymmetric PSE (which
arises when k  1   .) Figure A3 shows the density functions for both
players.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
Figure A4 displays individual e¤orts as a function of , with  xed as 1.
The expected e¤ort is higher for the strong player than for the weak player.
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An increase in asymmetry (reduction in k) implies higher expected e¤ort for
the strong player and lower expected e¤ort for the weak player. Near the
xed prize case ( = 0), the e¤ort di¤erences are small. Figure A5 displays
expected average prizes, expected average e¤orts and expected highest ef-
forts as a function of . Contrary to the symmetric case, the expected prizes
and expected average e¤orts di¤er. Even though the weak player is exactly
compensated for his e¤orts on expectation, the strong players expected ef-
forts di¤er from his expected prizes. His expected prizes and e¤orts are both
above costs, and they are generally not identical.
Figure A6 shows that the winning probability of the more e¢ cient player
is far from 1, in particular, for weak asymmetries (k = 0:95).
5.3.3 Comparing e¤orts for prize-equivalent AEP
Figures A7 and A8 show that the expected e¤ort of player 1 (2) is increasing
(decreasing) in  for xed expected prize. As in the symmetric case, the
expected highest e¤ort is increasing in  (Figure 6) within a class of prize
equivalent AEP. In particular, the expected highest e¤ort is higher in the
almost-linear case than in the xed prize case. Figure 6 also shows that, con-
trary to the symmetric case, the expected average e¤ort is non-monotone in 
(with an interior minimum). As in the symmetric case, increasing  increases
k = 0:95 k = 0:85
Figure 6: Expected highest e¤ort and expected average e¤ort for prize-
equivalent APA, where the expected prize equals 1
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the expected highest e¤ort. Contrary to the symmetric case, however,  has
ambiguous e¤ects on expected average e¤orts, because it increases the e¤ort
of the strong player and reduces the e¤ort of the weak player.
6 Applications
This section shows how innovation races, promotion contests and beauty
contests can be interpreted as AEP.
6.1 Incentives for product innovations
Consider the following set-up. Two symmetric rms spend R&D costs xi to
obtain a patent on a new product. The patent is awarded to the rm with
the higher xi; xi is also positively related to product quality. Once one of the
rms (say, rm 1) has obtained a patent, it is not possible without infringing
on the patent to produce a substitute that prevents the successful rm from
obtaining monopoly power.21 The R&D e¤ort is without value for the loser.
Market demand is D(p;x1), which is decreasing in p and increasing in x1. Let
pm(x1) be the monopoly price corresponding to quality x1. For simplicity,
marginal costs are constant and normalized to zero.
We can model the patent race between the two rms as an AEP with
a(x1) = p
m(x1)D(p
m(x1);x1), the monopoly prot of a rm with quality x1.
It is natural to assume that prots are increasing in quality. Moreover, in
many cases, the prot function is concave in x1. For instance, consider a
linear demand function D(p;x1) = (x1)
=2   p, where  2 (0; 1). Then, the
positive demand e¤ects of higher R&D costs decline su¢ ciently fast that
the monopoly prots (x1)

4
are concave under the parameter restriction. By
Corollary 2, for parameters such that prots are increasing and concave in
x1, the resulting MSE has a decreasing density. Moreover, we can compare
the expected quality in the market with a patent (which is the expected
21Alternatively, one might assume that there are no patents, but that the market can
only sustain the better rm, which limit prices the competitor. Then, we obtain an all-pay
auction with negative externalities, as treated experimentally by Darai et al. (2010) and
Sacco and Schmutzler (2011).
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highest R&D e¤ort) with the one that would have obtained in a race where
the successful player obtains a xed prize ( = 0) which compensates him
exactly for the expected average e¤ort. Applying the arguments of Section
4.3, the expected highest R&D e¤ort is higher in the patent race than in the
race where the xed prize is given. Thus patents induce a higher expected
highest e¤ort for any given expected average e¤ort than xed prizes.
6.2 Promotion contests
Consider a promotion contest where two employees exert e¤ort yi that is
used to determine who is promoted to the higher level. The direct value
of promotion is A > 0. Suppose that the e¤ort has additional benets to
the employee, because it is useful for his future career within the rm. For
instance, the employees knowledge about the organization might improve
as he exerts more e¤ort, making his life in the organization easier in the
future. Suppose that these e¤ects are potentially relevant if the employee is
promoted and if he is not, but that their size is di¤erent in the two cases,
given by L(yi) and W (yi), respectively. Net payo¤s are therefore L(yi)   yi
for the loser and A+W (yi)  yi for the winner.
Assume that 0  L0(yi) < 1 and 0  W 0(yi) < 1. Then  (yi)  yi  
L(yi) is a strictly increasing function capturing the e¤ort cost net of benets
without promotion. Let (xi)    1(xi). Dening xi  yi   L(yi), a loser
who chooses xi earns a net prize of  xi. A winner earns A + W (yi)  
yi = A +W ((xi))   L ((xi))   xi. Thus, with the prize function a(xi) 
max (A+W ((xi))  L ((xi)) ; 0), the game is an AEP if A +W ((xi))  
L ((xi))  0 8xi 2 R+ and A2 and A3 hold. A simple example where this
is true is when there exist constants ,! 2 (0; 1) such that L(yi) = yi and
W (yi) = !yi. Then (xi) = xi1  and, for a(xi)  A + (! )xi1  . In particular,
the prize function is decreasing if and only if ! < , that is, if and only
if e¤ort has a stronger e¤ect on the benets in the current job than in the
higher job.
Figure 7 shows the equilibrium distribution of yi in three di¤erent cases,
in all of which A = 5. The straight line in the middle depicts the uniform
distribution of yi when ! = 0:25 and  = 0:25, so that the e¤ort e¤ects on
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L and W are the same and W ((xi)) L ((xi))  0 (xed prize case). The
convex CDF corresponds to ! = 0 and  = 0:5, so that exerting e¤ort has
positive e¤ects only in the old job. The concave CDF corresponds to the case
that ! = 0:5 and  = 0, so that exerting e¤ort has positive e¤ects only after
promotion. Though the principal pays A in each case, the expected e¤orts are
highest in the latter case where the expected prize for the agents also consists
of the expectation of W ((xi))   L ((xi)) > 0. Agents intrinsic concerns
for their performance in the job can thus lead to higher or lower expected
average e¤orts, depending on whether the e¤orts have stronger e¤ects with
or without promotion.
Figure 7: E¤ort distributions in the promotion game
6.3 Beauty Contests
Suppose a downstream rm (the client) wants to procure a task from one
of two suppliers i 2 f1; 2g. These rms simultaneously choose costly and
observable e¤orts xi 2 R+ to prepare this project. Suppose the expected
value of the project for the principal is an increasing function V (xi) of e¤ort
and that the party who is awarded the contract receives a xed and commonly
known prize A > 0.22 The client awards the task to the supplier who exerted
the higher e¤ort. After that, the supplier carries out the task at a cost of
22The analysis can be easily modied to account for the case that parties who exerted
higher e¤ort receive a higher payment.
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C(xi). This function can be decreasing or increasing. A decreasing function
makes sense when high e¤ort results in good preparation of the project, which
makes it simpler to carry out. An increasing function is plausible when
convincing the principal requires coming up with a project that is costly
to nance ex post. In such a context, the logic of the previous subsection
applies: When the interests of the client and the suppliers are aligned, that
is, e¤orts reduce future costs of carrying out the project, the prize function
is increasing in e¤ort, conversely when e¤orts make the project more costly
to carry out in the future.
7 Conclusion
Many economic institutions have features of all-pay auctions with endogenous
prizes. This paper has shown that very general distributions can be obtained
as mixed-strategy equilibria of all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes, at
least in symmetric settings. It also shows which incentive systems yield high
expected highest e¤ort, while avoiding excessive e¤ort of losers. Compared
to all-pay auctions with xed prizes, all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes
generally do better in this respect, in particular, when prize functions are
approximately linear. When the prize functions have hurdles below which
there is no positive prize, this leads to further improvements.
The companion work of Jönsson (2013) analyzes symmetric AEP exper-
imentally. Though the behavior of subjects di¤ers substantially from the
prediction of Proposition 1, prelimary results suggest that the comparative
statics insights of Section 4.3 hold: Modifying an AEP in such a way that
expected average e¤orts are xed, but prizes become more sensitive to e¤orts
yields higher expected e¤orts.
The paper can be extended in various directions. Richer objective func-
tions of principals might be studied: Principals might be interested in other
goals than maximizing expected average or highest e¤ort. For instance, they
might care about the minimal e¤orts, or they might want to secure that all
players choose e¤orts close to some target level. And even if they care about
the expected highest e¤ort, they may be risk averse, which might lead to
very di¤erent optimal incentive systems than those described above. Never-
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theless, the techniques developed in this paper would appear to be a useful
step in deriving the appropriate systems for such alternative targets: The
implementation results at least show what kind of behavior can be induced
with suitable AEP.
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9 APPENDIX
9.1 Appendix 1: Proofs
9.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We appeal to the standard characterization result for MSE with continuous
action spaces (adapted from Osborne 2004, Proposition 142.2).
Lemma 1 F is a MSE if and only if (i) there is no action which, given the
opponentsbehavior, yields higher expected payo¤ than F and (ii) F assigns
zero probability to the set of actions for which, given the opponentsbehavior,
the expected payo¤ is less than her expected equilibrium payo¤.
We now prove Proposition 1. DEP implies that F (xi) as in (2) is strictly
increasing on (0; T ]. Moreover F (T ) = 1. If a(0) > 0 (C1) or a0(0) = 1
(C2), then limxi!0 F (xi) = 0 and F is a CDF without atoms, with support
[0; T ]. If neither C1 nor C2 holds, but C3 does, then limxi!0 (F (xi))
n 1 =
1
limxi!0 a(xi)
> 0. Hence limxi!0 F (xi) > 0 and F is a CDF with support [0; T ]
and an atom at zero with mass limxi!0 F (xi). (2) implies that expected
payo¤s are zero on [0; T ]. Because a(xi) < xi for all xi > T; F corresponds
to a MSE by Lemma 1.
9.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We rst prove several lemmas.
Lemma 2 If SYM holds, any symmetric MSE must satisfy (i) or (ii):
(i) It has no atoms, and M  min S = 0.
(ii) It has an atom at 0 with mass denoted as F (0).
Case (ii) requires that a(0) = 0 and qna0(0)  1 where qn = (F (0))n :
Proof. The proof has three steps:
Step 1: M  min S = 0 for every symmetric MSE without atoms.
Step 2: A symmetric MSE with an atom at ex > 0 does not exist.
Step 3: A symmetric MSE with an atom at 0 requires a(0) > 0 or qna0(0) >
1.
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Step 1: Suppose M > 0. For any sequence xn ! M , the probability of
winning approaches zero. By continuity, limxn!M a(xn) = a(M) < 1. The
expected net payo¤ thus falls below zero as xn !M , so that M =2 S.
Step 2: Suppose ex > 0 is an atom. This requires a(ex)  ex. In the proposed
MSE, for each player and each m 2 f1; :::; ng, there is a probability qm > 0
that he is among the m players with the highest e¤ort. The expected net
gain for a player from shifting the atom to the right by " is approximatelyPn
m=2 qm
m 1
m
a(ex) +Pnm=1 "qma0(ex)   ", which is positive if a (ex) > 0 and "
is su¢ ciently small. Thus, shifting the atom to the right by some su¢ ciently
small " increases expected payo¤s, a contradiction.
Step 3: Suppose there is an atom at 0. Then in the proposed MSE, all
players tie with some probability qn > 0. The expected net gain from shifting
the atom to the right by " is approximately qn n 1n a(0) + "qna
0(0)  ", which
is positive for su¢ ciently small " if a(0) > 0 or qna0(0) > 1. Thus, unless
a(0) = 0 and qna0(0)  1, shifting the atom to the right by some su¢ ciently
small " increases expected payo¤s, a contradiction.
Lemma 3 If SYM holds, then F (xi)n 1a(xi) = xi for all xi 2 S.23
Proof. By Lemma 2, for every symmetric MSE and all " > 0, there exist
xi < " such that xi is played. Also, there is no atom at 0 unless a(0) = 0.
Thus, expected payo¤s approach zero as xi does. By Lemma 1 (i), there
exists no xi 2 Xi for which F (xi)n 1a(xi)   xi > 0. Moreover, as 0 2 S, F
assigns zero probability to the set of xi for which F (xi)n 1a(xi)  xi < 0 by
Lemma 1(ii). Right continuity of F and a thus imply F (xi)n 1a(xi) xi = 0
8xi 2 S.
Lemma 4 If SYM holds, xL; xH 2 S and 0 < xL < xH , a(xH)xH 
a(xL)
xL
.
Proof. (2) implies a(xL)
xL
= 1
[F (xL)]
n 1 and
a(xH)
xH
= 1
[F (xH)]
n 1 . Monotonicity
of F implies a(xH)
xH
 a(xL)
xL
.
Lemma 5 If SYM and DEP hold, there can be no xL < xH such that xL 2 S,
xH 2 S, xL > 0 and  xL; xH \ S = ?.
23For a similar, which is applicable if, e.g., C1 holds, see Siegel 2009, Corollary 3.
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Proof. There are no atoms at xH by Lemma 2.
 
xL; xH
 \ S =? would
imply F (xL) = F (xH). Thus, by Lemma 3,
a(xH)
xH
=
a(xL)
xL
, violating DEP.
Lemma 6 If SYM and DEP hold, S = f0g [ [L; T ] for some L  0.
Proof. By Lemma 2, minS =0. By A3(i), S  [0; T ]. Next, for all " > 0,
S\ (T   "; T ] 6= ?, because there exists a left neighborhood of T such that
a(xi) xi > 0 in the entire neighborhood by A3(ii). Hence, maxS < T would
imply that a player obtains a positive prot by choosing xi 2 (maxS; T ). By
Lemma 5, S\ (0;1) is an interval.
Lemma 7 If SYM holds, [HS; T ]  S.
Proof. Suppose that [HS; T ] $ S. Arguments in the proof of Lemma 6
that do not depend on DEP show that T 2 S. Thus, there exists an L 2
(HS; T ] \ S and " > 0 such that (L  "; L) \ S =?. Choose xi 2 (L  "; L).
The mass of players choosing xi  L is

L
a(L)
 1
n 1
and there is no atom at L
by Lemma 2. A player who deviates from L to xi earns expected net payo¤s
L
a(L)
a (xi)  xi. This is positive if a(xi)xi >
a(L)
L
, which is true for L > xi > HS,
a contradiction. Thus, L = HS.
We now prove Proposition 2.
(i) From Lemmas 6 and Lemma 7, if SYM and DEP hold, S = f0g [
[HS; T ]. Thus, F (xi)
n 1a(xi) = xi on [HS; T ] by Lemma 3. DEP implies
HS = 0. Thus the MSE is as described in Proposition 1.
(ii) Suppose DEP does not hold, that is,HS > 0. By Lemma 4, [0; T ]  S.
However, by Lemma 7, [HS; T ]  S. As S  [0; T ], therefore there exists no
xi > 0 such that S = [0; xi].
9.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Consider a CDF F that admits a density f such that fxij f(xi) > 0g =
[0; C] for C > 0. Then, aF as in (3) on [0; C] is admissible: As to A2, di¤er-
entiability holds on (0; C]. Continuity at 0 holds if and only if limxi!0 a
F (xi)
is nite, that is, (4) holds. In this case, aF is also right di¤erentiable at 0.
Further, aF can always be extended to the right in a continuously di¤eren-
tiable way such that aF (xi) < xi on [C;1) and therefore A3(i) holds. A3(ii)
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holds because
 
aF
0
(C) < 1 for f(C) > 0. It remains to be shown that aF
satises C1 or C2 if and only if (5) holds. First, consider C1(ii) and C2(iii),
that is, DEP. This requires
F (xi)  xi (n  1) f(xi)
F (xi)n
<
1
F (xi)(n 1)
: (19)
(19) follows from f(xi) > 0: (5) is equivalent with the requirement that
limxi!0 a
F (xi) > 0 or limxi!0
 
aF
0
(xi) = 1 if limxi!0 aF (xi) = 0, that is,
with C1(i) or C2(i) and C2(ii).
(ii) The preceding analysis shows that C3 holds in this case.
9.1.4 Proof of Corollary 1
For aF (xi) = xi[F (xi)]n 1 ,
 
aF
0
(xi) =
[F (xi)] xi(n 1)f(xi)
[F (xi)]
n > 0. (6) thus holds if
and only if aF (xi) is increasing on (0; C]. As aF (0) = limxi!0 a
F (xi), aF (xi)
is increasing on [0; C].
9.1.5 Proof of Corollary 2
Implementability follows immediately from Proposition 3: For n = 2, (4)
holds if f(xi) > 0 and (5) holds if f(xi) is bounded. Part (i) and (ii) of the
Corollary are straightforward. (iii) is implied by (i) and (ii).
9.1.6 Proof of Corollary 3
aF (xi) as in (3) violates (4) if limxi!0f(xi) <1.
9.1.7 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) By (C4) and (C5), the sequences Hk and Jk are well-dened and stop after
nitely many iterations. F denes a distribution: It is increasing on each
Hk; Jk

, saties F
 
Jk+1

= F
 
Hk

, F (0)  0 and F (J1) = F (T ) = 1.
All xi 2 HK yield zero expected payo¤s. For xi =2 HK , expected payo¤s
are negative if xi > J1 = T . If xi 2
 
Jk+1; Hk

for k 2 1; :::; k   1, then
a(xi)
xi
 a(H
k)
Hk
. Expected payo¤s a (xi) H
k
a(Hk)
  xi are therefore non-positive.
(ii): analogous.
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9.1.8 Proof of Proposition 6
By Lemma 3, [F (xi)]
n 1 a(xi) = xi on S. Second, we show that HK 
S. From Lemma 7, [H1; J1]  S. Next suppose Hk; Jk  S, but 9xi
2 Hk+1; Jk+1 =2 S: Clearly, for every exi 2  Hk+1; Jk and all " > 0
9xi 2 (exi   "; exi) such that a (xi) Hka(Hk)   xi > 0, a contradiction. Thus,
Hk+1; Jk+1
  S and, by induction, HK  S. Finally, we show that
S  f0g [ HK . For xi > J1 = T , expected payo¤s are negative. Moreover,
by Lemma 4, if xL 2 S and xH 2 S, a(xH)xH 
a(xL)
xL
. Thus, as

Hk; Jk
  S, 
Jk+1; Hk
 \ S =?. If the conditions of Proposition 5(i) hold, HK = 0 and
thus S  f0g[HK =HK . If the conditions of Proposition 5(ii) hold, HK > 0
and F
 
Hk

= H
k
a(Hk)
> 0. Hence, there is an atom at 0 or Hk. The latter
possibility violates Lemma 2.
9.1.9 Proof of Corollary 4
The assumptions imply that K = 1 and H1 = 0. Thus, Proposition 5 gives
the result.
9.1.10 Proof of Proposition 7
Let aF
HS (xi) =
8<: 0 if xi 2 [0; HS) xi
F (xi)
 1
n 1
if xi  HS
. HS is the global maximum
of a
FHS (xi)
xi
on (0; T ], and it is interior. Corollary 4 yields the result.
9.1.11 Proof of Proposition 8
Let x1 = argmaxx12[0;r1] a(x1)   kx1, x2 = 0. By construction, x1 is a best
response for player 1. Because x1 > r2, player 2 will not deviate to x2  x1.
Deviation to x2 2 (0; x1) yields negative payo¤s.
9.1.12 Proof of Proposition 9
We rst prove a series of lemmas.
Lemma 8 (i) Player 2 earns expected payo¤s of zero on f0g [ [HA; T ].
(ii) Player 1 earns expected payo¤s w1 = (1  k)T on [HA; T ].
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Proof. (i) Choosing x2 = 0 yields expected payo¤s of 0 if a(0) = 0 or if
HA > 0. If a(0) > 0 and H

A = 0, then limx1!0F1(x1) = 0, so that expected
payo¤s of player 2 are still zero if he chooses 0. (13) implies that net expected
payo¤s are zero for x2 > 0 as well. (ii) By (14), player 1 obtains expected
payo¤ w1 for all x1 2 [HA; T ].
Lemma 9 Deviations of player i = 1; 2 to xi =2 Si are non-protable if
HA = 0 or ka(H

A)  a0(HA) (w1 + kHA)  0. (20)
Proof. By denition of T , deviations of player 2 to x2 > T are non-
protable. As C1 and C2 each imply a0(x1) < k for x1 > T , player 1
does not benet from deviating to x1 > T . Thus deviations to xi =2 Si
are unprotable if HA = 0 and, in particular, under C1. If C2holds and
HA > 0, player 2 cannot deviate protably to x2 2 (0; HA), as this would
involve positive e¤orts without ever obtaining the prize. Player 1 cannot
protably deviate to x1 2 (0; HA) if a0(x1)F2(0)   k  0 8 x1 2 (0; HA]. As
C2requires concavity of a(xi), this holds if a0(HA)F2(0)  k  0. Inserting
F2 (0) gives a0(HA)
w1+kHA
a(HA)
 k  0, that is, ka(HA) a0(HA) (w1 + kHA)  0.
Lemma 10 F 1 is a CDF. F

2 is a CDF if and only if
ka(HA)  a0(HA) (w1 + kHA)  0. (21)
Proof. By denition of T , F 1 (T ) = 1. By C1or C2, F

1 (x1) is increas-
ing on [0; T ]. Thus, (13) denes a CDF; it has an atom at HA with mass
F 1 (H

A) =
HA
a(HA)
. For F 2 to be a CDF, it has to be increasing, which requires
ka(x2)  a0(x2) (w1 + kx2)  0 8x2 2 [HA; T ] . (22)
C1implies (22) because a0(x2) < k and w1 = a(T )   T < a(x2)   x2. If
C2holds, the left-hand side of (22) is increasing in x2. Thus, (22) holds on
[HA; T ] if and only if ka(H

A)  a0(HA) (w1 + kHA)  0.
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Lemma 11 If
ka(0)  a0(0)w1  0. (23)
(20) and (21) both hold for HA = 0.
Proof. HA = 0 implies (20). (23) is (21) for H

A = 0.
Lemma 12 If C2holds and
ka(0)  a0(0)w1 < 0, (24)
HA 2 (0; T ) is the only e¤ort level that satises both (20) and (21).
Proof. For x1 > 0, (20) and (21) hold if and only if
ka(x1)  a0(x1) (w1 + kx1) = 0 (25)
(25) holds for x1 = HA as H

A > 0. C2implies that the left hand side of (25)
is increasing, so that the solution is unique.
We now derive Proposition 9. If C1holds, a(0) > a(T )   kT = w1 and
k > a0(0). Thus (23) holds. Hence, by Lemma 11, (20) and (21) hold for
HA = 0. Thus, Lemmas 9 and 10 imply that Part (a) of Proposition 9 holds.
If C2holds, Lemma 12 implies that HA > 0 satises (20) and (21); thus F1
and F2 are distributions by Lemma 10, and they correspond to an MSE by
Lemma 9; so that Part (a) of the Proposition also holds in this case. Part
(b) follows from the Denition of HA. Part (c) follows from Lemma 8.
9.1.13 Proof of Proposition 10
As the result for C1 has been shown by Siegel (2009, 2010), we conne
ourselves to C2. The proof follows from Lemmas 13-22. With few exceptions,
these results are so general that they do not require C2(or C1).
Lemma 13 Si  [0; T ] for any MSE and i = 1; 2.
Proof. x2 > T is not a best response for player 2 because a (x2) < x2.
Thus S2  [0; T ]. If player 1 chooses x1 > T , his net payo¤ is thus a(x1) kx1.
As a0(xi) < k for all xi  T , there exists an ex1 in (T; x1) such that the net
payo¤ is a(ex1)  kex1 > a(x1)  kx1. Thus x1 > T is not a best response.
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Lemma 14 If player i has an atom in x, then for j 6= i, there exists an
" > 0 such that there are no best responses in [x   "; x].
Proof. Suppose player i has an atom in x with mass p(x). Suppose
for all " > 0 there exists a best response xj  x such that jxj   xj < ".
By deviating to xj + ", player j would increase his expected prize by at
least approximately p(x)a(x
)
2
; his costs would increase by ". As "! 0, the
increase in the expected prize is higher than the increase in expected costs,
so that xj is not a best response.
Lemma 15 In any MSE, 0 2 S2 and the expected net payo¤ of player 2 is
zero, that is, F1 (x2) a (x2) = x2 for all best responses x2.
Proof. Player 2 obtains a payo¤ of at least zero by choosing 0. Thus,
F1 (x2) a (x2)  x2 for any best response and, by continuity, for any x2 2 S2.
To show that Player 2 does not obtain an expected payo¤ above zero, it
su¢ ces to show that there exists a best response x2 for which he wins with
probability arbitrarily close to zero. Let x  inf S1 [ S2. First, suppose
no player has an atom at x. By denition of x one can nd a sequence xn
converging to x such that xn is a best response for at least one player i.
As there is no atom at x, the probability of winning and thus the expected
payo¤ converges to zero as xn ! x. By Lemma 13, player 1 obtains a payo¤
of approximately w1 by choosing x1 just above T . Thus, xn cannot consist of
best responses for player 1. Hence, the xn are best responses of player 2 who
therefore obtains a payo¤ of zero in the MSE. Second, suppose exactly one
player has an atom at x. Then this player obtains zero payo¤s at x; and it
must therefore be player 2. Third, by Lemma 14, it is impossible that both
players have atoms at x. Finally, x = 0 and thus x 2 S2: Because player 2
wins with probability zero, his net payo¤s would be negative if x > 0.
Lemma 16 maxSi = T for i = 1; 2.
Proof. By Lemma 13, it su¢ ces to show thatmaxSi  T . IfmaxS1 < T ,
then by A3(ii), given the equilibrium strategy of player 1, player 2 could
obtain positive payo¤s by choosing x2 2 (maxS1; T ), contradicting Lemma
15. If maxS2 < T , a0(T )   k < 0 implies that player 1 could protably
deviate downwards from T . Therefore maxS2 = T .
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Lemma 17 If DEP holds, there can be no atom of player 2 at any x > 0.
Proof. If player 2 has an atom at x > 0, then by Lemma 14 there exists
an " > 0 such that there are no best responses of player 1 in (x   "; x] =
?. Thus, by choosing x2 2 (x   "; x), player 2 would obtain prots of
F1(x
)a(x2) x2. By Lemma 15, these prots are xa(x)a(x2) x2. Optimality
of x thus requires x

a(x)a
0(x) > 1, violating DEP.
Lemma 18 The expected payo¤ of player 1 is w1 in any MSE.
Proof. By Lemma 16, given the equilibrium strategy of player 2, player
1 can guarantee himself a payo¤ of arbitrarily close to w1 > 0 with certainty
by choosing an e¤ort level just above T . By Lemma 17, player 2 cannot have
an atom at T . Therefore, player 1 must obtain an expected payo¤ of exactly
w1 at T .
Lemma 19 Let H1  minS1.Then (0; H1) \ S2 = ?.
Proof. Player 2s expected payo¤s for x2 2 (0; H1) are negative.
Lemma 20 (i) If C2holds, then @ x; x 2 S1 with x < x such that (x; x) \
S2= ?.
(ii) If C2holds, then @ x; x 2 S2\(0;1) with x < x such that (x; x)\S1 = ?.
Proof. (i) Suppose 9 x; x 2 S1 with x < x such that (x; x) \ S2 =
?. If so, then, by choosing x1 2 (x; x), player 1 would obtain prots of
F2(x)a(x1)   x1 and thus, using Lemma 17, F2(x)a(x1)   x1. x 2 S1 thus
requires F2(x)a0(x) = F2(x)a0(x)  1. x 2 S1 requires F2(x)a0(x)  1. These
two conditions together violate C2.
(ii) Suppose 9 x; x 2 S2 \ (0;1) with x < x such that (x; x) \ S1 = ?.
Then x =2 S1 is impossible. To see this, note that Player 2 has no atoms at
any x2 > 0 by Lemma 17. Thus lim"!0 F2 (x  ") = F2 (x) and 8" > 09 2
(0; ") such that F2 (x  ) F2 (x  ") > 0. If x =2 S1, " can be chosen so that
F1 (x2) a (x2) = F1 (x  ") a (x2) on [x  "; x  ]. Thus F1 (x  ") a0 (x2)  1
on this interval, violating C2. By analogous arguments, x =2 S1 is impossible.
Thus, x; x 2 S1 and (i) shows that (x; x) \ S2 6= ?. As player 2 has no
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atom, this would require that there exists an open subinterval of (x; x) in S2.
Because (x; x) \ S1 = ?, this would imply that F1(x)a(x2)   x2 is constant
on (x; x), which is incompatible with C2.
Lemma 21 If C2 holds, 9HA > 0 such that S1 = [HA; T ] and S2 = f0g
[ [HA; T ].
Proof. Let H2 = min (S2 \ (0;1)). By Lemma 19, H1  H2. We show
that H1 < H2 is impossible. First, suppose there exists x1 2 (H1; H2) \ S1.
This implies F2(0)a(H1)   H1 = F2(0)a(x1)   x1, violating C2. Second,
suppose (H1; H2) \ S1 = ?. Thus, H1 must be an atom of player 1. As
H2 is not an atom of player 2 by Lemma 17, F2(H1) = F2(H2) = F2(0) and
H2 2 S1. Thus, F2(0)a0(H1)  1 and F2(0)a0(H2)  1. These conditions
together violate C2.
Thus H1 = H2. Therefore, if H1 = 0, then H2 = 0 and, by Lemma 16 ,
f0; Tg  Si (i = 1; 2). Suppose Si  [0; T ]. Then there exist x > x > 0 such
that (x; x) \ Si = ?. Hence, by Lemma 20, x =2 Sj or x =2 Sj (j 6= i). Thus,
there exists a subinterval of (x; x) which has empty intersection with S1 and
S2. Choose the interval such that x is minimal and x is maximal. Then by
Lemma 17, there can be no atom of player 2 in x or x. Thus either there is an
atom of player 1 at these e¤ort levels or S2 must contain intervals of the form
(x  "; x) or (x; x+ ") > 0. Because of C2, the latter possibility can only
arise if x 2 S1 (x 2 S1). In any event, x 2 S1, x 2 S1 and (x; x) \ S2 = ?,
which is inconsistent with C2 by Lemma 20. If H1 = H2  HA > 0,
analogous arguments show that S1 = [HA; T ] and S2 \ (0;1) = [HA; T ] by
Lemma 20.
Lemma 22 Suppose C2holds and HA 6= HA. Then there can be no MSE
with S1 = [HA; T ] and S2 = f0g [ [HA; T ].
Proof. This follows from Lemma 12.
Proposition 10 now follows immediately: Lemmas 21 and 22 imply that
S1 = [HA; T ] and S2 = f0g [ [HA; T ]. Lemmas 15 and 18 imply that the
distribution must satisfy (13) and (14).
39
9.1.14 Proof of Proposition 11
We rst show that (17) is su¢ cient for implementation by monotone net
prize functions. By Proposition 9, this requires that a(x1) satises A2 and
A3 and C1. As to A2, the candidate function a(x1) = x1F1(x1) is continuously
di¤erentiable for x1 > 0. Continuity at 0 requires limx1!0a(x1) =
1
f1(0)
<1,
which is equivalent with f1(0) > 0. A3 is clearly satised. C1is equivalent
with (17). Necessity follows because A2 is violated if (17) does not hold.
9.1.15 Proof of Proposition 12
We show that (18) is su¢ cient for implementation by a strictly concave price
function. By Proposition 9, this is true if the candidate prize function satises
A2 and A3 and C2. A2 follows as in the proof of Proposition 11. A3 is clearly
satised. C2is equivalent with (18).
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9.2 Appendix 4: Figures
Figure A1: Prize-equivalent APA
Figure A2: Prize functions corresponding to prize-equivalent APA
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Figure A3: Equilibrium densities for player 1 (left) and 2 (right);  = 1; k =
0:95
k = 0:95
Figure A4: Expected E¤orts of players 1 and 2 with  = 1
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k = 0:95
Figure A5: Expected Highest E¤ort, Expected Average E¤ort and Expected
Average Prize with  = 1
Figure A6: Comparative Statics: Winning Probability of Player 1 for k =
0:95 and k = 0:85
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k = 0:95
Figure A7: Expected E¤ort of Player 1 for prize-equivalent APA
k = 0:95
Figure A8: Expected E¤ort of Player 2 for prize-equivalent APA
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